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a b s t r a c t
The consequences of having a leader in a swarm are investigated using differential game theory. We
model foraging swarms with leader and followers as a non-cooperative, multi-agent differential game.
The agents in the game start from a set of initial positions and migrate towards a target. The agents
are assumed to have no desire, partial desire or full desire to reach the target. We consider two types
of leadership structures, namely hierarchical leadership and a single leader. In both games, the type of
leadership is assumed to be passive. We identify the realistic assumptions under which a unique Nash
equilibrium exists in each game and derive the properties of the Nash solutions in detail. It is shown
that having a passive leader economizes in the total information exchange at the expense of aggregation
stability in a swarm. It turns out that, the leader is able to organize the non-identical followers into
harmony under missing information.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
There are certain advantages of having a leader in a swarm.
The leader may initiate the route and the remaining group mem-
bers follow that path (Estrada & Vargas-Estrada, 2013). Therefore,
leader designates the search direction (Wang & Wang, 2008). By
leader guidance, a wider area can be covered and the collisions
can be avoided (Wang & Wang, 2008). Moreover, leader–follower
swarms reach consensus more rapidly (Estrada & Vargas-Estrada,
2013). There are also cases, where consensus may not even be
guaranteed by only simple rules and choices of specific leaders be-
come necessary to ensure consensus (King & Cowlishaw, 2009).
Leadership also provides orientation improvement and coordi-
nation via communication in the group (Andersson & Wallan-
der, 2004;Weimerskirch, Martin, Clerquin, Alexandre, & Jiraskova,
2001). Leader–follower swarms have a multitude of practical ap-
plications such as robot teams, ship flocks, UAVs, and vehicle pla-
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0005-1098/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.toons. The leader may play various roles in such systems. In robot
teams, a leader is generally an active one, who itself is motion-
controlled by an external control input (Kawashima & Egerstedt,
2014). In ship flocks, leader may enable coordination of possibly
under-actuated followers (Lapierre, Soetanto, & Pascoal, 2003). In
unmanned aerial vehicles, leader may provide reference position
and velocity for followers (Karimoddini, Lin, Chen, & Lee, 2013).
In vehicle platoons, leader ensures string stability where tight for-
mations are maintained (Peters, Middleton, & Mason, 2014). In
optimization techniques such as PSO, leader usually follows the
shortest path, i.e., the line towards the minimum and the fol-
lowers perform the search around that line (Chatterjee, Goswami,
Mukherjee, & Das, 2014). In all these systems, leaders constitute a
small subset of the group that guides the coordination of thewhole
network (Estrada & Vargas-Estrada, 2013).
We strive to understand the mechanisms of spontaneous
formation of swarms via dynamic non-cooperative game theory of
Basar and Olsder (1995) and necessary conditions of optimality of
Kirk (2012). We define ‘‘spontaneous formation’’ as the formation
of collective behavior based on non-cooperative decisions. Nash
equilibrium is ideally suited to model such mechanisms. In Nash
equilibrium, each agent gives a best response to the decisions of
other agents which results in a collective behavior. We use a game
theoreticalmodel and askwhether such equilibrium exists. It turns
out that the Nash solution exists and is unique for continuous
strategies and for the information structures studied here.
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dynamicmulti-agent gameswith non-convex cost functions iswell
known (Bressan & Shen, 2004). This continues the quest in Özgüler
and Yıldız (2013) and Yıldız and Özgüler (2015), in which, the ex-
istence and uniqueness of two swarm games were successfully
shown under some realistic assumptions on the information struc-
ture among group members and on the allowed strategies to the
agents. Here, we focus on passive leaders that are singled out by the
other agents, not because they command, coordinate, or organize,
but because of their present geographical position in the group.We
study two information structures that define games with passive
leaderships. The first structure corresponds to an ‘‘ordered graph’’,
Chvátal (1984), and here it is referred to as hierarchical leadership.
The second structure corresponds to a ‘‘directed star’’ graph, Col-
bourn, Hoffman, and Rodger (1991), and here it is referred to as
single leadership. In both games, the swarm members are allowed
to be ‘‘non-identical’’ and eachmember measures its distance only
to those members that are ahead. Both games may be compared
with the v-formation of birds (although we limit our study to one-
dimensional swarms) because an agent’s (level of) leadership de-
pends on how close it is to the top of the hierarchy, Nagy, Ákos,
Biro, and Vicsek (2010) and Wang and Wang (2008). These games
have a loose information structure as very little amount of atten-
tion span is needed from an agent during its journey. One conse-
quence of this sparsity in intra-swarm communication is economy
in energy expenditure. Power and energy expenditure reduction
is indeed an essential feature of v-formation (Cutts & Speakman,
1994; Hainsworth, 1988; Weimerskirch et al., 2001), and (Speak-
man & Banks, 1998).
The swarmingmodels introduced in this article offer significant
improvements over (Özgüler & Yıldız, 2013; Yıldız & Özgüler,
2015). Current models cover non-identical agents, which extends
the identical agent structure of Özgüler and Yıldız (2013) and
Yıldız and Özgüler (2015). Also, in the current model, the agents
act with position information of only the forward agents. Ordered
graph and directed star information structures used here are less
restrictive than those in Özgüler and Yıldız (2013) and Yıldız
and Özgüler (2015). Note that, neither of the four information
structures (the ones here and those in Özgüler and Yıldız (2013)
and Yıldız and Özgüler (2015)) is a special case of the remaining
three.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the
definitions of the games considered, the individual cost functions
that model the motive of each agent and their interpretation as
the total effort of an agent in the foraging journey. In Section 3,
the main results, the existence and uniqueness of a Nash solution,
and its features that relate to a swarming behavior are listed. In
Section 5, we discuss the necessity of the constraints posed in the
definitions of the games. In Section 4, four swarm games that have
Nash solutions are compared. Section 6 is on conclusions. Detailed
proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 are given on the web page (Yıldız &
Özgüler, 2016).
2. Two games with leader–follower structure
The games defined are based on motives of a group of agents
under two different hypotheses on information structure. In both
games, when the agents are assumed to be foraging, say, for food,
they start from some initial positions and try to migrate towards a
target location. In cases of foraging or non-foraging, and also with
orwithout specified target location, wewould like to show that the
non-cooperativemotives of the agents lead to a collective behavior
dictated by a Nash Equilibrium of the games, whenever it exists.Game L1 (Hierarchical Leadership): Determine minui{L
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dt, 2 ≤ i ≤ N.
(1)
Game L2 (Single Leader): Determine minui{L
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} subject to ẋi =






















− r̄i|xi(t) − x1(t)|

dt, 2 ≤ i ≤ N.
(2)
In both games, L1 is the cost minimized by one agent and Li, i =
2, . . . ,N , are the costs minimized by the others, where N is the
swarm population. The swarming duration is specified as T > 0,
ui(t) = ẋi is the control input, and xi(t) is the position at time
t ∈ [0, T ] of the ith agent. The adhesion aj > 0 is an attraction
parameter and rj > 0 is a repulsion parameter. Parameters γ ≥ 0
and β ≥ 0 weigh the foraging efforts; the higher they are, the bet-
ter is the desire to reach foraging target by the respective agent.
The agents control their velocities to minimize their total effort,
which consists of kinetic energy ui(t)2 as well as the artificial po-
tential energy. Here, combined attractive, repulsive, and foraging
terms in the cost function of an agent is interpreted as the artificial
potential energy of that agent, Gazi and Passino (2004).
The exact foraging target is normalized to be the origin in
x1(T ) . . . xN(T )-space. The agents may have varying degrees of de-
sires to reach this target in Games L1 and L2. The foraging task
is performed through the presence of the foraging terms with
weights γ and β in the cost functions since their minimizationwill
imply that an agent is as close to the origin as possible. If these
terms are removed from the cost functions and, instead, the termi-
nal conditions x1(T ) = 0, . . . , xN(T ) = 0 are required, then this is
a slightly different game and will be referred to as the specified ter-
minal condition game. If x1(T ), . . . , xN(T ) are altogether free, then
there is no foraging requirement and the corresponding slightly
different games (in which the foraging terms are simply removed
from the cost functions) will be called the free terminal condition
games.
The cost functions considered in this game are similar to those
in Özgüler and Yıldız (2013) and Yıldız and Özgüler (2015) with
important differences. In all games, the indexing of the agents in-
dicate the ranking in the initial queue of the agents. The agent of
index 1 starts at the closest position to the foraging target and that
with index N , to be at the farthest. Here, agent-1 and others have
different cost function structures, as opposed to the uniform struc-
ture in Yıldız and Özgüler (2015). Second, we extend the identi-
cal agent form of Yıldız and Özgüler (2015) to non-identical agents
by allowing coefficients a and r to vary among different agents
who have no desire, partial desire, or full desire to reach the tar-
get. Above all, we alter the self organized structure in Özgüler and
Yıldız (2013) and Yıldız and Özgüler (2015) to a leader–follower
structure. The agent of index 1 is distinguished by its ignorance
of the position of any other member in the group in the duration
of the whole journey. Each agent in Game L1 is assumed to ob-
serve (measure) and know the positions of the agents ahead of
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agent-1 only. The latter is the loosest information structure among
those in Özgüler and Yıldız (2013) and Yıldız and Özgüler (2015),
Game L1, and Game L2. One way to view Game L1 is that each
agent exhibits a different level of leadership based on its rank in
the swarm. In otherwords, all the agents except the rearmost agent
perform leadership by being under surveillance by the agents at its
back. The agent in front is a full leader relied upon by all remaining
agents in Game L2. Therefore, the passive leadership is somewhat
hierarchical in the first case, whereas one distinguished agent is
the passive leader and all others are followers in the latter case.
The information structures of these two games are illustrated in
Fig. 1. An arrow emanating from agent-i to agent-j indicates that i
keeps track of its distance to j during the foraging journey.
Solving the games via minimizing the inter-dependent non-
convex cost functions in (1) and (2) is challenging due to several
reasons.While it is relatively easy to transform the problems posed
by Games L1 and L2 into problems of finding solutions to systems
of differential equations, these are nonlinear and unfortunately do
not obey any Lipschitz conditions. A further difficulty is that these
systems havemixed boundary conditions.We are able to surmount
these difficulties, only because a postulate on the ranking of the
agents in the queue during the whole journey eliminates the
nonlinearity of the system. Of course, this postulate, in turn, needs
to be verified by the solutions obtained; a task that is sometimes
doable.
3. Main results
Wenow summarize themain results for Games L1 and L2 under
three different specification schemes on the foraging target and list
their implications in relation to the swarming behavior.
3.1. Nash solution for Game L1
Let α1 := 0, αk :=
√
a1 + · · · + ak−1, k = 2, . . . ,N be called
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β sinh(αkT ) + αk cosh(αkT )
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1 − bk(t) −
β sinh(αkt)
β sinh(αkT ) + αk cosh(αkT )

,
k = 2, . . . ,N.
(3)
Theorem 1. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the hierar-
chical leadership game under continuous strategies if and only if γ ≥
β ≥ 0. The Nash equilibrium has the following features:
P1. The initial ordering among the agents is preserved during 0 ≤
t ≤ T .
P2. The leader trajectory and the distances to the leader are given
by
x1(t) = b1(t)x1(0),




+ ck(t)rk−1}, 2 ≤ i ≤ N.
(4)(a) Game L1. (b) Game L2.
Fig. 1. Information structures of two swarm games.
P3. The swarm size is given by




{bk(t)|xk(0) − xk−1(0)| + ck(t)|rk−1|}.
P4. The swarm center xc := (1/N)(x1 + · · · + xN) follows the
trajectory








{bk(t)[xk(0) − xk−1(0)] + ck(t)rk−1}, t ∈ [0, T ].
P5. If the foraging target is specified for all agents including
the followers, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium of Game
L1 for continuous strategies. The distance expressions are obtained
from (4) in the limit as γ , β → ∞ in (3).
P6. If the foraging task is dropped, then there still exists a unique
Nash equilibrium for continuous strategies. The distance expressions
are obtained by (4) by substituting γ = 0 and β = 0 in (3).
Remark 1. (i) Note that the Nash solution is valid when β = 0
and γ ≥ 0. If in addition γ > 0, then this is the case in
which only the leader has a desire to reach the foraging target.
If γ = 0, then there is no foraging task at all, which is the
situation considered by P6. In case there is no foraging task,
then the leader’s optimal trajectory is x1(t) = x1(0) ∀ t ∈
[0, T ], i.e., the leader preserves its initial position at all times.
In the resulting Nash equilibrium, other agents progressively
get closer to the leader in time.
(ii) The necessity of γ ≥ β , i.e., the foremost leader having
more desire to reach the foraging target is quite intuitive since
otherwise, under certain initial conditions, the agent of index
1 will fall behind. However, agent of index 1 does not observe
its distance to the other agents so that a consensus (a swarm)
is not formed at all. This is illustrated in Yıldız and Özgüler
(2016) where the leader is overtaken by the followers so that
a Nash solution does not emerge.
(iii) If adhesion increases as aj → ∞ for all j = 1, . . . ,N , then all
agents instantaneously stick to each other and move towards
the target location altogether.
(iv) Under constant adhesions, if rj → ∞ for all j = 1, . . . ,N ,
then the agents suddenly depart from each other, stay in that
location until the final time T and suddenly move towards the
target location as t → T as the foraging terms becomes more
effective in the cost functions.
(v) If the target is specified to all agents (γ , β → ∞), then
starting at any set of initial positions, all agents end up
precisely at the foraging target. If γ → ∞ and β = 0, then
the followers stillmove towards the target location, but do not
end up exactly at the target.
166 A. Yıldız, A.B. Özgüler / Automatica 73 (2016) 163–1683.2. Nash solution for Game L2
Let ᾱk :=
√
ak, which will figure as convergence rates for Game
L2, and suppose that xi(0) > x1(0) for 1 < i ≤ N . Define
ρ̄k(t) =
γ − β
γ T + 1

sinh(ᾱk+1t)
β sinh(ᾱk+1T ) + ᾱk+1 cosh(ᾱk+1T )

,





1 − b̄k(t) −
β sinh(ᾱkt)
β sinh(ᾱkT ) + ᾱk cosh(ᾱkT )

,






γ T + 1
, k = 1
β sinh[ᾱk(T − t)] + ᾱk cosh[ᾱk(T − t)]
β sinh(ᾱkT ) + ᾱk cosh(ᾱkT )
,
k = 2, . . . ,N.
(6)
Theorem 2. There is a unique Nash equilibrium for single leader
game under continuous strategies if and only if γ ≥ β ≥ 0. The
Nash equilibrium has the following properties:
P1. The Agent-1 remains the leader throughout the journey. There
are initial conditions that lead to legitimate ordering changes among
the agents unless ai = a for all i = 2, . . . ,N.
P2. The leader trajectory and distances of the followers to the leader
are given by
x1(t) = b̄1(t)x1(0),
xi(t) − x1(t) = ρ̄i−1(t)x1(0) + b̄i(t)[xi(0) − x1(0)]
+ c̄i(t)r̄i 2 ≤ i ≤ N.
(7)









P4. The swarm center xc = (1/N)(x1+· · ·+xN) follows the trajectory





{ρ̄i−1(t)x1(0) + b̄i(t)[xi(0) − x1(0)]
+ c̄i(t)r̄i}, t ∈ [0, T ].
P5. If the foraging target is specified for all agents including
the followers, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium of Game
L2 for continuous strategies. The distance expressions are obtained
from (7) in the limit as γ , β → ∞ in (5).
P6. If the foraging task is dropped, then there still exists a unique
Nash equilibrium for continuous strategies. The distance expressions
are obtained by (7) by substituting γ = 0 and β = 0 in (5).
Remark 2. (i) In this loose information structure, a unique Nash
equilibrium is still reached if and only if the leader has more
desire to reach the target location (γ ≥ β).
(ii) The ordering in the resulting swarm is such that the leader
maintains its position at all times. On the other hand, changes
of ordering among followers are permissible in this Nash
equilibrium.
(iii) If āi = a and r̄i = r for all i = 2, . . . ,N , then no ordering
change occurs among the agents since Game L2 becomes a
special case of Game L1.
(iv) The trajectory dynamics in Game L2 (under all three types
of target specification) are always dominated by hyperbolic
functions. This is a consequence of the hypothesized types of
the artificial energy components in the cost functions (1) and
(2) as well as the dynamic constraint. In fact, the same kind of
dynamics dominate the other trajectories resulting in Game
L1 as well as in Games 1 and 2.(v) If adhesion is large such that āi → ∞ for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,N},
then agent i instantaneously sticks to the leader and moves
towards the target location with the leader.
(vi) If r̄i → ∞ for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, then the agent i suddenly
departs from the swarm, stays there until the final time T
and suddenly moves towards the target location as t → T
when the foraging term becomes more effective in the cost
functions.
(vii) In both Games L1 and L2, if some agents are initially at
the same position, then the Nash solution is such that they
maintain the same position during the whole journey.
4. Comparison of nash equilibria in four games of swarm
The two games considered here and the earlier swarm games
of Özgüler and Yıldız (2013) and Yıldız and Özgüler (2015) will
now be compared focusing on the Nash equilibria that result.
We compare only the specified terminal condition versions of
these four games. This is merely for convenience since under
specified target location, the trajectories end up exactly at x1(T ) =
0, . . . , xN(T ) = 0 so that the resulting trajectory expressions are
all more compact. Same analyses and conclusions are also valid
when the agents have a partial desire (free terminal condition) or
no desire (unspecified terminal condition) to reach target location.
Let us define the game in Özgüler and Yıldız (2013) as Game
1, and the game in Yıldız and Özgüler (2015) as Game 2. The first
significant difference of the four games; Game 1, 2, L1, and L2 is
that the initial ordering may change in Game L2 when at least
one agent is different from the rest, i.e., it is not the case that
ai = a for all i. This is not possible in Game L1, 1, and 2. In earlier
Games 1 and 2, the attraction and the repulsion parameters were
assumed to be the same across the swarm population, i.e., the
individuals across each swarm were assumed to be identical. The
above conclusion was observed to be valid in Games 1 and 2,
even when we allowed different values for adhesions in the same
swarm. To be able to compare other differences and similarities
among the four games, we now make the assumption that ai =
aj = a and ri = rj = r , for all i, j in Games L1 and L2.
Moreover, we assume that the population N is ‘‘relatively large’’ in
making the comparisons among dependence on initial conditions
and among maximum swarm sizes. This has the effect of making
the information structure of Game 2 disadvantageous because the
bordering agents, agents 1 and N do not keep track of each others
positions, except in a very indirectmanner. The following tables are
formed using Theorems 1 and 2 and the properties and formulae
in Özgüler and Yıldız (2013) and Yıldız and Özgüler (2015) derived
for Games 1 and 2.
Game 1 Game 2





a 2 cos( kπN )
√
a
Trajectory of swarm center Line Line
Correlation with xi(0) Very high Very low
Maximum swarm size Very small Very large
Game L1 Game L2








Trajectory of swarm center Hyperbolic Hyperbolic
Correlation with xi(0) Low High
Maximum swarm size Small Large
∗ Only in case of identical agents
We can observe from this table that the convergence rate in all
cases is directly proportional to the square root of adhesion. Its
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(c) Game L1. (d) Game L2.
Fig. 2. Comparison of optimal trajectories of Games 1, 2, L1, and L2.
dependence on swarm population N is interesting. Only in Game
L2, the convergence rate is independent of the population of the
swarm, whereas in Game 1 it is proportional to the square root of
N . In Games 2 and L1, the convergence rate of the agent’s trajectory
depends on its position in the queue and increases as we go down
to the last agent in the queue. The back-and-forth symmetry in
the information structure implies that the center of the swarm
follows a line. In the leader games, it plots a function of the same
type as agent trajectories. As the information exchange among the
swarm members gets sparser, the dependence of the trajectories
on the initial conditions get lower. The consequence of this is that
the initial positional configuration in a swarm is less preserved in
looser information structures. Maximum swarm size values follow
a similar pattern to this, in that, looser the information exchange,
larger is the maximum swarm size.
Fig. 2 verifies these conclusions on example trajectories that
one observes in the resulting Nash equilibria in all four games of
swarm with population N = 7 and T = 1 under the same initial
positions, attraction, and repulsion parameter values a = 40,
r = 10. The trajectories of the swarm centers are shown marked
with diamonds.
5. Comments on generalizations of swarm games
Various assumptions that shape the motives of the agents in
the games considered here are those that are needed to be able to
obtain games with solutions as well as games that result in explicit
analytic expressions for trajectories of the members of the swarm.
Obviously, themost general information topology will be obtained
if the parameters that weigh the attraction and repulsion terms as
well as the target specification in the individual cost functions (the
parameters a, r , γ , and β above in (1) and (2)) are allowed to be
arbitrary positive numbers. Thus consider the game: Minimize for
i = 1, . . . ,N ,













− rij|xi(t) − xj(t)|

dt, (8)
subject to ui = ẋi for i = 1, . . . ,N , where βi, aij, and rij are all positive.
Our investigations indicate that in this more general formulation,a Nash solution fails to exist. Mainly because the assumption of
continuous strategies with respect to the initial positions prohibits any
change of order. The assumptions on the relative size of the weights in
the individual cost functions considered here are thus not arbitrary but
necessary (since when they are violated, one can find suitable initial
conditions for which a solution with the postulated order among the
agents fails to exist). A collection of such counterexamples to existence
of Nash equilibria is listed in Yıldız and Özgüler (2016).
As an example, consider the order preserving property. It turns out
to be closely tied to uniformity of attraction and repulsion parameters.
It can actually be shown that, even if the attraction, repulsion, and
foraging parameters are not equal but sorted like
aij = 0 if i < j,
aij . akj if i ≥ k,
rij = 0 if i < j,
rij ≫ rkj if i ≥ k,
βi ≤ βk if i ≥ k,
where 0 ≪ aNj and 0 ≪ rj+1,j, then the ordering is again preserved. See
Yıldız and Özgüler (2016) for a detailed proof. It is however difficult to
quantify how close the adhesions or how far apart the repulsions need
to be.
6. Conclusions
We have considered two non-cooperative swarming games of
leader–follower information structures and identified appropriate
assumptions underwhich uniqueNash equilibria exist. The existence of
a foraging task is irrelevant for aggregation stability and a swarm-like
behavior still results. The accomplishment of the foraging task, when it
is there, depends onwhether the (foremost) leader has a desire to reach
the target location at least as well as the other swarm members. We
have also compared these two games with the earlier games (Özgüler
& Yıldız, 2013; Yıldız & Özgüler, 2015) through analytic expressions
and simulations. The generalization of these results to more than one
dimension, especially to 3D, is obviously needed for potential robotics
applications. Based on some preliminary simulation results on small
population swarms, we are encouraged to continue our efforts in that
direction.
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